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orthodox economists made successful inroads in partially recapturing this rebel territory and many a premature obituary of development economics was written.2 It is an irony of the recent history of economic thought that while this process of taming the unruly heretics and bringing them back to the orthodox faith was going on, the pillars of orthodox Walrasian economics were themselves crumbling at the onslaught of a whole generation of mainstream economists armed with their models of informational asymmetry, imperfect and incomplete markets, dynamic externalities and increasing returns to scale, multiple equilibria and self-reinforcing mechanisms of path dependence, models which development economists of yesteryear would have been comfortable with, even though some of these were beyond their own model-making capacity. While under the sponsorship of international agencies market fundamentalism was being rammed down the throat of the hapless debt-ridden countries in the so-called third (and now also the second) world, faith in it was being considerably shaken among mainstream economic theorists.
In this Reformation that economic theory has been undergoing I believe the contributions of the main concerns of development economics, those faint rumblings from the periphery, have not been insignificant. Stiglitz (1989) reminds us:
A study of LDC's is to economics what the study of pathology is to medicine; by understanding what happens when things do not work well, we gain insight into how they work when they do function as designed. The difference is that in economics, pathology is the rule: less than a quarter of mankind lives in the developed economies.
One may add that orthodox Walrasian economics has not fared very well in the diagnosis and treatment of even relatively healthy economies, and in the current revamping of the main body of economic analysis insights garnered over the years from the pathological cases have turned out to be quite useful. In the following discussion I shall, somewhat schematically, refer to several of these insights.
Efficiency Wage Theory
When in recent years high and persistent unemployment in developed countries became a focus of serious attention, macro and labor economists in search of micro-foundations of this disturbing phenomenon turned to issues which exercised many development economists in the 1950s and 1960s: how to explain the coexistence of a significant positive wage and massive unemployment and underemployment; the puzzle was particularly striking for densely populated agriculture of poor countries where trade unions are weak or 2For example, see Hirschman (1982), Little (1982) and Lal (1983).
non-existent and minimum wage legislation is hardly enforced. One of the theories-developed independently by Leibenstein (1957) and Mazumdar (1959)-built on the link between nutrition intake and work efficiency and explored the effects of this link on wages and involuntary unemployment: at too low a wage, the productivity of a worker may also be too low for the employer to be interested in hiring him or her. This is the now-famous efficiency wage theory, although its current interpretations have generalized the link between wage and efficiency in terms of incentives, morale and effort-intensity (see the papers in Akerlof and Yellen, 1986), and even this generalization was first recognized in the context of less developed countries by .
The models of Leibenstein and Mazumdar are, I believe, the first to illustrate the general principle that if the price of a factor or a good has functions other than simply the usual market-clearing one (for example, indicating something about the quality of the factor or the good), one essentially gets beyond the confines of the market-clearing Walrasian equilibrium, and, as Stiglitz has shown in several papers, many real-world phenomena like involuntary unemployment or credit rationing become analytically tractable as examples of this general principle. Another important corollary of the same models is that the usual separability of equity and efficiency of orthodox economics breaks down: a more egalitarian distribution of land, for example, by reducing the malnourishment of the currently unemployed, may lead to a rise in aggregate output in the economy (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986 ). The general principle involved here is now recognized in the literature on imperfect information and transaction costs: the terms and conditions of contracts in various transactions, which directly affect the efficiency of resource allocation, crucially depend on ownership structures and property relations. The idea that whether a market economy is or is not Pareto efficient depends on the distribution of wealth was generalized in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
Dynamic Externalities
Apart from non-clearing labor markets, the other major preoccupation of early development theory was the large impact of positive externalities on the development process. Three or four decades later, the so-called new growth theory is trying to formalize this idea of how externalities generated by investment can explain divergence in growth outcomes across countries or regions. The old literature classified two major types of such externalities: technological and pecuniary. This distinction, originally due to Viner, was popularized by Scitovsky (1954) .
Technological externalities relate to the spillovers from one firm's investment on the productivity of other firms in the same or other sectors. The 3This paper influenced the subsequent literature in labor economics on the importance of labor turnover and the mechanisms (such as deferred compensation) intended to control it. recent growth literature-which starts with Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1990 and Lucas (1988)-has increased the consciousness of the profession about the importance of these external effects (particularly those flowing from investment in human capital). However, it tends to overlook (and thus fails to learn from) the earlier development literature which abounds with many examples of (and sophisticated debates on) these effects through learning, skill-formation, machine user-supplier interaction, networks of technology diffusion, and so on. The idea of how plant-level economies of scale get translated into increasing returns at the aggregate level through "pecuniary" external economies, which was so central to the development economics of the 1950s, lost much of its intellectual force in the subsequent decades, not so much because it lacked, until recently, a firm anchoring in a formal model using tools of imperfectmarkets equilibrium analysis, as Krugman (1992) suggests, but more because at the policy level the difficulties of aggregate coordination were underestimated (particularly at the existing levels of administrative capacity and political coherence in the developing countries) and the incentive and organizational issues of micro-management of capital were underappreciated. The resulting government failures diverted the profession's attention from what nevertheless remains an important source of market failure discovered by early development economics.
Multiple Equilibria and Hysteresis
Growth models with increasing returns, macroeconomic models of unemployment equilibrium with imperfect competition, and game-theoretic models have generated a plethora of cases of multiple equilibria in the recent literature in economics. The 1950s development theory started with a presumption of multiple equilibria and posed the essential problem as one of escaping a "low-level equilibrium trap" to a better higher-income equilibrium. There were 7This can be particularly important when jointly used infrastructure and other non-traded support services and inputs are indispensable for the production process. 8An earlier formalization of the idea of gains from coordination in the process of industrialization drawing upon Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse is presented in the development textbook of Basu (1984) in terms of conjectural demand on the lines of non-Walrasian equilibrium analysis. two quite distinct mechanisms involved in the models of that decade: one worked through the economic-demographic interactions of income, savings and endogenous population growth, so the problem was to escape a Malthusian trap with a "critical minimum effort"-as in the models of Buttrick (1958) , Nelson (1956) and Leibenstein (1957) ; the other was based on the kind of increasing returns which generate strategic complementarities among sectors, through a process of "cumulative causation" (Myrdal, 1957) , requiring a coordinated "big push" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943) for industrialization.
In the literature on multiple equilibria with underdevelopment traps, one can discuss two different dynamic processes of how a particular equilibrium actually gets established. The economic-demographic models, as well as models of learning and international specialization (where a poor country gets trapped in an historical pattern of specialization) or of unequalizing spirals in NorthSouth interaction (Krugman, 1981 (Krugman, , 1987 , focus on the decisive role of history or initial conditions. The task of development policy here is to compensate for an historical handicap. On the other hand, big-push models like that of Rosenstein-Rodan emphasize the role of expectations (about investment by other firms) and self-fulfilling prophecy. The task of development policy is to coordinate expectations around high investment. This "history versus expectations" dichotomy has been further analyzed by Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1991), and the relative importance of the past and expected future is shown to depend on some parameters of the economy (like the discount rate and the speed of adjustment).
The importance of hysteresis in a model of multiple equilibria with increasing returns has now been highlighted in the work on path-dependence in technological development and industrial location in developed countries (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) and in models of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1987). Expectation-driven multiple equilibria are now a prominent feature in models of network externalities in technology adoption (Farrell and Saloner, 1986) and in macroeconomic models of search (Diamond and Fudenberg, 1987; Howitt and McAfee, 1988) . In all these models, the desirability of adopting a particular course depends on how many others are expected to do the same, a general point which Rosenstein-Rodan, Scitovsky and others tried to drive home in development economics decades back.
Multiplicity of equilibria also creates more intellectual space for cultural, sociological and political factors in influencing the process of economic adjustment to an equilibrium. Early recognition of this may partly explain why the "Develops" in Leijonhufvud's Econ tribe were among the first to break the taboo against association with "Polscis," "Sociogs" and other tribes.
Persistence of Dysfunctional Institutions
The self-reinforcing mechanisms which bring about hysteresis and "lock-in" can also be used to explain the persistence of socially suboptimal institutions. Development economists, particularly those with a radical orientation, have never tired of pointing to many long-lasting institutions in poor countries which block economic progress. The property-rights school and the "new" institutional economists often implicitly or explicitly deny this: their account of how more efficient institutions and governance structures evolve in response to new benefit-cost possibilities often displays a certain ahistorical functionalism and even a kind of vulgar Darwinism about the survival of the fittest institution. The more recent literature on institutional economics, however, validates the insight of development economists about suboptimal institutions.
Transaction costs, which form the base of the new institutional economics, themselves can reduce pressures from any social selection process by raising barriers to entry and exit. Then there are the self-reinforcing forces, like increasing returns from adopting a particular institution locking in what may turn out to be an inferior institution in the long run or like a mutually sustaining network of social sanctions on deviants. Akerlof (1984) , drawing partly upon the example of the Indian caste system, has built models to show how economically unprofitable or socially unpleasant customs may persist as Nash equilibria when each individual conforms out of fear of loss of reputation from disobedience. These equilibria are difficult to disturb by small shocks.
Principal-Agent Models and Missing Markets
Many of the existing suboptimal institutions may, nevertheless, be serving some real economic function under a set of informational constraints and missing markets (particularly of credit and insurance in the case of poor countries). In the 1970s and 1980s, when economic theory was going through a major overhaul to accommodate imperfect and asymmetric information and incomplete markets and jettisoning some of its fundamental theorems on the way, development economics was often at the forefront in this change-over, since those information problems are particularly acute in the context of development. Stiglitz provided the leadership to a whole group of development economists probing the microeconomic rationale of the formation of agrarian institutions in poor countries in an environment of pervasive risks, information asymmetry and moral hazard.9 Stiglitz's (1974) model of share-croppingviewing this ancient institution as a compromise between risk and work incentive effects-is one of the first fully worked out principal-agent models in economics; in this paper he explicitly points out that the agency problem of sharecropping is in some respects essentially the same as the problem of management within a corporation.'0 Some other problems in developing countries inspired work on adverse selection models: for example, Akerlof's famous "lemons" paper (1970) was motivated to a large extent by his experience in 9For an overview of this literature, see Bardhan (1984) , Bardhan (1989) and Stiglitz (1988) . 10Even ignoring risk and incentive effects, the idea of share-cropping, where the marginal cost of employing labor is less than the average cost, thus lending an inherent bias toward expanding employment and output, influenced Weitzman's famous work on the share-economy (1984) in the context of macroeconomic stagflation. India (it says in its first paragraph: "This paper presents a struggling attempt to give structure to the statement, 'Business in underdeveloped countries is difficult'"); and Stiglitz's (1975) paper on education as a screening device-one of the early papers on screening and signalling-was explicitly in response to questions posed to him in Kenya about the role of higher education.
Development economists have always emphasized the crushing effects of capital market imperfections (or even non-existence), in terms of dictating smaller scale in production and risk-taking and of adoption of myopic policies. These problems are now better appreciated in the literature on credit rationing under imperfect information and imperfect enforcement, particularly as the agency costs in the credit market rise when the borrowers are poorer. The development literature has also pointed our attention to the conflict between the risk-pooling advantages of a large formal credit market and the monitoring advantages of local, informal, sometimes non-market, lending. Studies of successful schemes of traditional rotating credit associations and also group loans (as in the widely noted case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) in poor countries have focussed attention on the important idea of peer monitoring, which as Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) have argued, can be an important mechanism for controlling moral hazard in credit markets, labor markets and insurance markets in both developed and less-developed countries. 
The Enforcement Problem in International Loan

Targeting in the Theory of Economic Policy
Various arguments indiscriminately used in support of protection in developing countries gave rise, in reaction, to the theory of economic policy under what are called "domestic distortions" in the literature on international trade theory. For example, popular arguments for protection (or even banning of some imports) with a view to curbing luxury consumption of the rich in poor countries, were countered quite early in the trade and development literature by the argument that a trade restriction is not the first-best policy for achieving this or other purely domestic objectives. For example, if curbing luxury consumption is the objective, the first-best policy is to have a consumption tax on luxuries; if reducing economic inequality is the objective, progressive income and wealth taxation may be better than tariffs on luxury imports.
Similarly, if an infant industry cannot get off the ground on account of an inability to raise credit to cover initial losses in an imperfect credit market, then the optimum policy may be to subsidize credit, not protection. In several papers in the 1960s by Ramaswami, Bhagwati, Srinivasan and Johnson, all synthesized later in a paper by Bhagwati (1971), the general principle of targeting in economic policy was developed: "distortions" or departures from the usual marginal conditions of Pareto-efficiency are best tackled by using policy instruments that act most directly on the relevant margin. Not merely is this the most general result available to this day in the theory of trade policy, it allowed liberal economists the leeway, in departure from the practice of classical economists, to be an interventionist on matters of domestic policy and at the same time to be a free-trader in the international arena.
One extension of this literature originating in the concerns of development policy came in the form of the well-known Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) result in the theory of public finance on the desirability of aggregate production efficiency, under certain conditions, even when the first-best optimum is not achievable (in the absence of lump-sum taxes to adjust consumer incomes). Again, intervention is to be directed as closely as possible to the source of the distortion, to be applied to the prices the consumers (not the producers) face.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
This part of applied welfare economics, which dates back to Dupuit This paper has identified several areas where ideas which have had considerable influence in both microeconomics and macroeconomics, were first developed in the context of development economics. Sometimes recent theorists were driven by their own intellectual agenda to these ideas, oblivious of the pre-existing and quite rich development literature. In particular, as economic theory has turned more toward the study of information-based market failures, coordination failures, multiple roles of prices and the general idea of the potential complexity of market interactions, it has inevitably turned to questions that have long exercised development economists. The latter in turn are nowadays more aware of the healthy disciplining effects of market rivalry (even when markets work highly imperfectly) and of the pitfalls of reflexive interventionism.
There is, of course, no doubt that over the years development economics has benefitted a great deal from the concepts and tools pioneered in other fields. But it has not been a one-way traffic. While the problems of the world's poor remain as overwhelming as ever, studying them has generated enough analytical ideas and thrown up enough challenges to the dominant paradigm to make all of us in the profession somewhat wiser, and at least somewhat more conscious of the possibilities and limitations of our existing methods of analysis. * I am grateful to Kaushik Basu, Michael Kevane, Dani Rodrik, Carl Shapiro, Joseph Stiglitz, Timothy Taylor and Chris Udry for valuable comments.
